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BAMN! THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STRIKES DOWN 
MICHIGAN’S PROPOSAL 2 
 
J. Kevin Jenkins, Ed.D.* & Pamela Larde, Ph.D.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For at least the last two decades, the University of 
Michigan has had a formal policy of promoting racial and 
ethnic diversity among its student body.1 To achieve this 
diversity, various units of the university give some degree of 
preference in the admissions process to persons from selected 
racial and ethnic groups. Members of non-preferred groups, 
along with some members of the preferred groups, have 
objected to the policies, and legal and political battles have 
ensued. These battles continue to this day, and the United 
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a case on this 
issue for the October 2013 term.2 
Some issues related to consideration of race in admissions at 
the University of Michigan have already been ruled on 
substantively by the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger3 and 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Educational Leadership, Tift College of Education, 
Mercer University. 
† Assistant Professor of Research, Tift College of Education, Mercer University. 
1 The University may well have had such policies prior to the early nineties, Coal. 
to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality 
By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470 
(6th Cir. 2012), but the current formal policy of Michigan’s law school was adopted in 
1992 and that of the University’s undergraduate school at least as early as 1995, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314–315 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). 
2 BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). In October 2012, the Court heard oral 
arguments on closely related issues in University of Texas at Austin v. Fisher on appeal 
from the Fifth Circuit. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). The 
Fisher case presented the Court with arguments that may or may not affect the status 
of the BAMN appeal.  If the Court holds all consideration of race unconstitutional, 
then the BAMN appeal arguably becomes moot.  But if the Court approves of some 
consideration of race in the Texas case, then the related questions presented by the 
BAMN case will likely become the next-most-pressing issue in the broad area of 
consideration of race in admissions for the Court to reconcile. 
3 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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Grutter v. Bollinger4 in 2003. In Gratz, the Court ruled that the 
University of Michigan undergraduate college’s admissions 
program amounted to a quota,5 and thus was unconstitutional.6  
But on the same day, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the policy implemented by the University of Michigan Law 
School in the Grutter case,7 the first case in which a majority 
of the Court approved the use of non-remedial consideration 
of race in the context of admissions decisions. Following the 
Grutter decision, the people of Michigan amended their 
Constitution through a ballot initiative (Proposal 2) that 
prohibited the use of racial preferences by government 
agencies, explicitly including public universities of the state. In 
response to Proposal 2, a group known as the Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN) filed suit in federal court against the state, asserting 
that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Proposal 2 was upheld in federal district court in March 
2008,8 and the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. On November 15, 2012, the en banc appeals court held 
in BAMN v. Regents of the University of Michigan9 that 
Proposal 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, restoring the university’s authority to 
consider race as part of the admissions process. This Article will 
give a brief history of the development of the BAMN10 case, a 
description of the opinions by the District Court and the Sixth 
Circuit, a discussion analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of 
                                                 
4 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
5 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 245. 
6 Id, at 275. 
7 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
8 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
9 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012). 
10 In the Sixth Circuit opinion in this case, the court used the term “coalition” to 
describe the group of plaintiffs. In this Article, the authors use the term “BAMN” to 
refer both to the group of plaintiffs and the case itself. They do this to avoid 
confusion with a Ninth Circuit case titled Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 
which will also be mentioned in this Article. 
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the court’s opinion, and a conclusion exploring the 
implications of the case. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAMN CASE 
In the early 1900s, the ability to pursue a college education 
was still a privilege enjoyed by few. Student bodies largely 
consisted of white males whose fathers were well-educated and 
held high-profile jobs in medicine, law, or business.11 Many 
distinct classes of people, including women and African-
Americans, were underrepresented in the major institutions of 
higher education.12 In some cases, unmarried women were 
allowed to attend in order to pursue a career in teaching. 
However, if these women chose to marry, they were expected 
to drop out of school.13 The few African-Americans who were 
admitted into prestigious universities were often subjected to 
racism from their peers, as well as from university faculty and 
administrators. For example, in the 1920s at Harvard 
University, African-Americans were not allowed to share dorm 
rooms with their white peers. They had to choose between 
footing the cost of rooming alone or finding another black 
student with whom to room.14 Until World War II, Princeton 
University did not admit black students into their 
undergraduate programs, allowing them only to attend 
Princeton’s Theological Seminary.15 
A number of movements and initiatives challenged classic 
universities to become more inclusive and accessible. Only a 
few decades after the abolition of slavery, African-Americans 
who desired to pursue a college education began opening their 
own institutions, as they were not allowed to attend most of 
the predominantly white colleges in the country.16 These 
                                                 
11 See generally Howard B. London, Transformations: Cultural Challenges Faced 
by First-Generation  
Students, 1992 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR COMTY. COLL. 5 (2006); see also GEORGE 
MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT 
ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994). 
12 MARSDEN, supra note 11. 
13 London, supra note 11. 
14 MARSDEN, supra note 11, at 359–60. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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institutions, known as Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities (HBCUs), were established to educate African-
Americans in an era and a society that offered them few other 
higher education opportunities.17 
After the long history of racial exclusion and isolation in 
institutions of higher education described above, the cultural 
and legal tide began to turn in the mid-twentieth century. As a 
result of Brown v. Board of Education,18 University of 
California Regents v. Bakke,19 and other similar cases, as well as 
general societal shifts, the need for equal access to and 
participation in higher education for formerly excluded 
groups became an increasing priority in America. But while the 
ideal of increased participation is laudable by modern ethical 
standards, the mechanics of a system that might lead to such an 
increase at highly competitive institutions, while at the same 
time surviving legal challenges, have been difficult to develop. 
In order to increase participation of historically excluded 
groups, individual members of those groups must be both 
willing and qualified to participate. Colleges and universities 
have been faced with a chronic scarcity of qualified minority 
applicants for admission, particularly at institutions to which 
admission is highly competitive.20 
                                                 
17 Thomas F. Nelson Laird et al., African American and Hispanic Student 
Engagement at Minority Serving and Predominantly White Institutions, 40 J.C. 
STUDENT DEV. 39 (2007). Today, HBCUs are highly successful in retaining and 
graduating African-Americans who go on to pursue graduate and doctoral degrees. In 
fact, African-Americans who attend these institutions tend to have greater academic 
success than African-Americans who attend predominantly white institutions. Women 
also began to establish all-female colleges across the country, providing educational 
opportunities to this underrepresented group. As a result of the establishment and 
growth of these institutions after World War I, the number of African-Americans and 
women who took advantage of the opportunity to pursue a college education 
increased sharply. See London, supra note 11; MARSDEN, supra note 11. 
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
20 See generally RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH: HOW 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY 
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012); see also, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
253–54 (2003) (“During all periods relevant to this litigation, the University has 
considered African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be 
‘underrepresented minorities,’ and it is undisputed that the University admits 
‘virtually every qualified . . . applicant’ from these groups.”). 
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The literature on this subject offers various explanations 
for the phenomenon. Due to economic, social, and racial 
disparities—disparities that are largely attributed to segregated 
neighborhoods that offer inferior educational resources21—
students of color (particularly African-Americans, Latinos, and 
American Indians) struggle to access the opportunities of 
higher education that exist in the United States. These groups 
are more likely to attend public schools with high 
concentrations of students of color from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds and do not receive the academic preparation or 
critical information needed to advance to college.22 
Even when students of color from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds are college-qualified and have strong academic 
credentials, they are still reported to enroll in college at 
relatively low rates.23 This disparity has been attributed to the 
lack of support first-generation students receive from their 
families and influential adults in their lives.24 In fact, many are 
discouraged from aspiring to a college education by family, 
peers, and even teachers and administrators in their schools.25 
The full explanation for the ongoing scarcity of qualified 
persons from historically excluded groups is complex, with 
contributing factors varying with the individual, and will be 
the subject of ongoing debate among social scientists for the 
foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the fact remains that 
competitive institutions of higher education have found it 
difficult to find what they consider to be a sufficient number 
of such persons.26 Consequently, institutions have at times 
                                                 
21 Nelson Laird et al., supra note 17, at 39–56. 
22 Id. at 41. 
23 LAURA HORN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH & 
IMPROVEMENT, MAPPING THE ROAD TO COLLEGE: FIRST-GENERATION STUDENTS’ 
MATH TRACK, PLANNING STRATEGIES, AND CONTEXT OF SUPPORT (2000), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/2000153.pdf. Of the highly qualified first-generation 
students in Horn’s study, approximately 25% were not enrolled at a four-year 
institution and another 13% had not enrolled at any postsecondary institution. 
24 Jennifer Engle et al., Straight From the Source: What Works for First-
Generation College Students, 23 THE PELL INST. 1 (2006). 
25Id. See also R.G. Fryer, “Acting White”: The Social Price Paid by the Best & 
Brightest Minority Students, 6 EDUC. NEXT 53 (2006), available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/aw_ednext.pdf. 
26 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
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resorted to granting preferential treatment to minorities in the 
admissions process by effectively lowering objective 
admissions standards as they apply to preferred applicants.27 
Individuals from groups treated as over-represented have 
objected to preferential systems due to the fact that a 
preference to members of one race necessarily penalizes 
members of non-preferred races, given the limited number of 
seats in a class. 
Among the first lawsuits related to consideration of race in 
admissions from the field of higher education was University 
of California Regents v. Bakke.28 Allan Bakke, a white 
applicant to medical school at the University of California-
Davis, had been denied admission in favor of objectively less-
qualified applicants pursuant to the medical school’s quota 
system, which was designed to ensure a certain percentage of 
minority students.29 Finding meaning from the Bakke decision 
has been difficult from the start, even to members of the 
Court who issued the opinion.30 At least three firm principles 
may be taken from Bakke, however: 1) race-based quotas are 
unconstitutional,31 2) the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
always prohibit governmental consideration of race,32 and 3) all 
                                                                                                             
majority, noted that the Director of Admissions at the University of Michigan Law 
School testified at trial that “she must consider the race of applicants because a critical 
mass of underrepresented minority students could not be enrolled if admissions 
decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores.” Id. 
27 Id. at n.20. 
28 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (ruling that the 
plaintiff’s case was moot due to his provisional admission during pendency of the 
trial). 
29 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
30 Id. at 324–25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the mature 
consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to [this case has] resulted in 
many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court”). 
31 Id. at 289 (“To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally 
qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants 
could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to 
minority applicants.  Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a 
line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.”). Arguably, even drawing this 
principle from Bakke was debatable because the Justices who agreed with Justice 
Powell that Allan Bakke must be admitted to the medical school thought that his 
statutory right to admission was sufficient and the constitutional question should not 
have been reached. 
32 Id. at 325 (“Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of race in university 
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governmental decision-making processes that consider race 
must pass strict judicial scrutiny.33  The inherent tension in 
these principles was apparent in the several concurring and 
dissenting opinions in Bakke, and in the state of confusion in 
equal protection law that prevailed after Bakke.34 In fact, even 
these three principles were the subject of ongoing judicial and 
political battles, and the narrow and shifting majorities 
supporting each of them in the Bakke decision made them 
somewhat shaky legal ground for a time.35 In the three decades 
after Bakke, though, the law has developed to a point where all 
three of these principles have been solidified to reliability.36 
While these principles from Bakke were settled relatively 
quickly, a part of Justice Powell’s opinion that was arguably 
dicta had what might be considered a greater impact on both 
the law and politics. Specifically, his statement that race could, 
                                                                                                             
admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us [Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun] to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it 
prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future.”). 
33 Id. at 291. “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” 
Id. “Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts 
‘fundamental rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to 
‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government 
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.” Id. at 357. 
34 John Dayton, An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Concerning the Legal Status 
of Racial Diversity Programs in Educational Institutions, 133 ED. LAW REP. 297, 314 
(1999) (“The Court’s fragmented decisions in affirmative action cases have produced 
more heat than light, resulting in significant confusion concerning the legal status of 
race-conscious programs.”). 
35 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to the affirmative action program at issue due to its purportedly benign 
intentions), overturned by Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict 
scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race). 
36 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007) (“[T]he plans 
are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has 
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”). “It is well established that when the 
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.” Id. at 720.  “This Court 
has recently reiterated, however, that ‘all racial classifications [imposed by government] 
. . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” Id. at 741 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) 
(“[G]overnmental action based on race—a group classification long recognized as in 
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to 
detailed judicial inquiry” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). 
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consistent with strict scrutiny, be considered a plus factor 
spawned a movement toward the acceptance of race as a 
compelling governmental interest in admissions decisions.37 In 
spite of the fact that none of Justice Powell’s colleagues joined 
him in the part of the Bakke opinion upholding diversity as a 
compelling governmental interest, colleges and universities 
across the country tailored admissions plans to satisfy his plus-
factor statement.38 
Given the at-that-time tenuous nature of Justice Powell’s 
diversity rationale, members of non-preferred racial groups 
who had been denied admission under diversity plans sued. 
Cases from universities in Georgia, Texas, Washington, and 
Michigan all made it to federal appellate courts with varying 
results.39 Culminating the process by which the diversity 
rationale made its way through the appellate circuits were the 
Supreme Court cases Gratz v. Bollinger40 and Grutter v. 
Bollinger.41 In these cases, the undergraduate program and the 
law school at the University of Michigan, respectively, were 
sued for considering race in the admissions process.  However, 
while the law school had developed a plan that ultimately 
survived the Court’s strict scrutiny,42 the plan implemented by 
the undergraduate school did not. 
                                                 
37 See generally PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT (2003). 
38 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (“Public and private universities across the Nation have 
modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-
conscious policies.”). 
39 Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that student 
body diversity is not a compelling governmental interest that justifies racial 
preferences in admissions) and Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 
1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking down a diversity program as not narrowly tailored, but 
opining that diversity is not a compelling interest) with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law 
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(holding in both cases that student body diversity does constitute a compelling 
governmental interest that justifies racial preferences in university admissions). 
40 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
41 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
42 In upholding the law school’s admissions plan, the Grutter Court held for the 
first time that student body diversity could serve as a compelling governmental 
interest. While recognizing the difficulty courts had had in determining the weight to 
accord Justice Powell’s notion of diversity, the Grutter majority essentially adopted it, 
effectively settling the issue to a large degree in the context of higher education 
admissions decisions for the time being. 
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The Court’s decisions in Grutter and Gratz had both legal 
and political ramifications.  Concerning the law of racial 
preferences in admissions, institutions of higher education can 
use the Grutter and Gratz decisions as guidance for their 
admissions policies as they pertain to the promotion of 
diversity. Based on Grutter, absent any state law provisions to 
the contrary, for a limited time colleges may legally consider 
race as one of many plus factors in the admissions process, so 
long as they do not isolate preferred minorities from 
competition in the process. Based on Gratz, however, they must 
do so in a narrowly tailored manner.43 What constitutes narrow 
tailoring is still difficult to define, and is dependent on the 
totality of the admissions process. But in Gratz the Court 
found that granting twenty of 100 points total based solely on 
race was not narrow tailoring, and, in fact, approached being a 
quota.44 
From a political perspective, while the Grutter decision 
outlined to some degree the permissible boundaries of 
consideration of race in the admissions process, it did not 
mandate its consideration. Instead, universities that chose to 
grant a plus factor could do so consistent with Grutter and 
applicable state law. After Grutter, advocates for racial 
neutrality in the admissions process sought to change Michigan 
law to prohibit the consideration of race at the public colleges 
and universities of the state through a ballot initiative 
commonly referred to as Proposal 2. They succeeded in doing 
so, ultimately leading to an amendment to the Michigan 
Constitution that states in relevant part: 
                                                 
43 See William Thro, The Constitutionality of Racial Preferences in K-12 
Education After Grutter & Gratz, 211 ED. LAW REP. 537, 551 (2006) (“With respect to this 
narrow tailoring process in the context of educational admissions, Grutter and Gratz 
decreed that such programs must provide for individualized consideration; be 
undertaken only after a serious good faith consideration of the viability of non–racial 
alternatives; not unduly burden non–minorities; and be periodically reviewed and of 
limited duration.”). 
44 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (“[U]nlike Justice Powell's example, where the race of a 
‘particular black applicant’ could be considered without being decisive . . . the LSA’s 
automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . . 
decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority 
applicant.”). 
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(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State 
University, and any other public college or university, community College, 
or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education or public contracting. 
 
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily 
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or 
community college, school district, or other political subdivision or 
governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not 
included in sub-section 1.
45
 
As a result of this amendment, Michigan’s public 
universities were legally forestalled from granting racial 
preferences to candidates for admission.  But the legal battle 
was not over as advocates of racial preferences, while fighting 
the political battle, had simultaneously prepared to file a 
complaint alleging that Proposal 2 violated the Federal 
Constitution. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IN BAMN 
Proposal 2 went into effect December 3, 2006, but by that 
time, two separate groups of plaintiffs had already filed suit 
asserting that it violated the U.S. Constitution and federal 
law.46  Collectively,47 the plaintiffs sought to overturn 
Proposal 2 as it applied to university admissions, arguing that it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education 
                                                 
45 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
46 BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932 (E.D. Mich. 
2008). 
47 As noted above, there were two different groups of plaintiffs, each advancing 
theories that overlapped in some areas and differed in others. Since the details of 
which plaintiffs asserted which arguments are not important to the substance of this 
article, the authors will treat the claims as if they were from one group of plaintiffs. 
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Amendments of 1972.48 
The district court began its analysis of the substantive 
issues by addressing the Equal Protection claims of the 
plaintiffs. It did so through two different lenses: conventional 
Equal Protection analysis and analysis under the 
Hunter/Seattle49 line of Supreme Court cases. Additionally, the 
court ruled on arguments that Proposal 2 was preempted by 
federal law. Regarding the conventional equal protection 
analysis, the court observed that “college admission at elite 
universities is a zero-sum enterprise, and programs that prefer 
some students on the basis of race must do so necessarily at the 
expense of other applicants not of the preferred race.”50 In 
light of this “stark reality,” the district court detailed Supreme 
Court holdings that establish strict scrutiny as the standard for 
all racial classifications by all levels of government in the 
United States.51 
Applying conventional equal protection analysis, the court 
noted that the first step in the process “is to determine whether 
the challenged legislation draws any classification.”52 Further, 
“the determining factor is not whether the enactment has race 
as its subject matter, but whether it facially purports to accord 
unequal treatment across racial lines.”53 Holding that Proposal 2 
is facially neutral, the court then sought to determine whether 
it “was motivated by a racial purpose or object, or is 
unexplainable on grounds other than race.”54 The court found 
no evidence of intent to discriminate via the facially neutral 
Proposal 2 and noted the problematic nature of assigning 
                                                 
48 BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
49 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 
U.S. 457 (1982). 
50 BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
51 Id. at 948–49 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 
(1978); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (noting two Supreme 
Court opinions, one in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and another in 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), both applying intermediate 
scrutiny to racial classifications, but citing the portion of the Adarand decision 
specifically overturning Metro Broadcasting). 
52 BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 949. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 949–50 (citing Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d 352, 368 (6th Cir. 
2002)). 
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intent to an entire electorate in any case.55 Concluding its 
traditional equal protection analysis, the court noted that 
while sufficient evidence of a disparate impact on minorities 
would result from Proposal 2 to warrant a trial,56 there was 
insufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose.57 Thus, 
summary judgment for the defendant was warranted under 
the traditional equal protection analysis. 
Turning to the Hunter/Seattle58 equal protection analysis, 
the court described the plaintiff’s argument as follows: 
They reason that before Proposal 2, minority groups could petition 
university officials to implement affirmative action programs, or at least 
consider race among a host of non-academic factors in making admissions 
decisions. However, after Proposal 2, the only way racial minorities can 
secure programs that account for race in the assembly of a student body is to 
seek and obtain passage of another constitutional amendment. That daunting 
process, they contend, imposes a unique and heavy burden upon them as a 
class and unconstitutionally distances them from the political process when 
they seek what the law allows, even if what they seek can be characterized as 
an advantage.
59
 
The court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that Proposal 
2 made it more difficult for minorities to pass legislation in 
their interests.60 Nonetheless, the court recognized the 
difference between laws prohibiting unequal treatment based 
on race and those that provide for racial preferences.61 Based on 
                                                 
55 Id. at 950 (“Examining intent in the context of a ballot initiative presents a 
unique problem due to the sheer number of individuals whose intent is relevant.”). 
56 Id. at 951. 
57 Id. “It is the demonstration of a discriminatory purpose that vexes the 
Coalition plaintiffs and dooms their conventional equal protection argument, since 
the plaintiffs must show that Proposal 2 was enacted ‘because of, not merely in spite 
of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’” Id. The court further noted the 
testimony of both Ward Connerly and Jennifer Gratz, two of the chief proponents of 
Proposal 2, in which both articulated non-discriminatory reasons for espousing the 
measure. 
58 As the Hunter/Seattle test is the basis upon which the Sixth Circuit overturned 
Proposal 2, the authors will explain it in further detail in the context of that opinion 
below. 
59 BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 953. 
60 Id. at 956 (“There is no question, therefore, that Proposal 2 makes it more 
difficult for minorities to obtain official action that is in their interest.”). 
61 Id. at 956–57 (citing Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 
1997)) (“While the Constitution protects against obstructions to equal treatment, it 
erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its own terms.”). 
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this distinction, the court held, “Michigan may limit the 
ability of discrete groups to secure an advantage based upon a 
racial classification without offending the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”62 Therefore, the Hunter/Seattle equal protection 
argument of the plaintiffs failed. 
Having held that Proposal 2 did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause under either a traditional equal protection 
analysis or the Hunter/Seattle test, the district court turned its 
attention to the preemption argument. The plaintiffs claimed 
that both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972 preempt Proposal 2. In 
order to preempt a state statute or a state constitutional 
provision, Congress must intend to do so, and this intent must 
be either expressed or implied in the federal statute or 
regulation in question.63 In some cases, congressional intent to 
preempt is implied when a conflict exists which makes it 
physically impossible to comply with federal and state law 
simultaneously.64 It is this type of conflict preemption that is 
recognized by the terms of Title VI.65 The court noted that 
while Title IX is a gender-based analogue to Title VI, it also 
contains an express provision that it does not mandate 
preferential treatment. Finding that Proposal 2 contains 
language that resolves any conflict between federal and state 
law in favor of federal law if compliance with state law would 
result in a loss of federal funds such as those provided by 
Titles VI and IX,66 the court held that Proposal 2 is not 
preempted by either federal statute. 
                                                 
62 Id. at 957. 
63 The power of Congress to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution (“the Laws of the United States, which shall be made 
in Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
64 For a clear and concise explanation of the general law of federal preemption 
of state law, see Richard J. Scislowski, Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co.: A New Defense 
of State Tort Law Against Federal Preemption—Is It Legitimate?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 
373, 374–376 (1995). 
65 BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (“By its terms, Title VI recognizes conflict 
preemption only.”). 
66 Id. at 958. 
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IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION IN BAMN 
In contrast to the district court, the Sixth Circuit ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs, holding that Proposal 2 did violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.67 As they had at the district court 
level, the plaintiffs in BAMN advanced two theories for why 
Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause: first, under a 
“political process” equal protection analysis and second, under 
a more conventional equal protection analysis regarding the 
impermissible classification of individuals based on race.68 
Regarding the political process argument, the BAMN court 
relied on the Supreme Court cases Hunter v. Erickson69 and 
Washington v. Seattle School District No.1.70 Citing Seattle, the 
BAMN court stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute . . . that given 
racial or ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or 
precluded from entering into the political process in a reliable 
and meaningful manner.”71 Citing Hunter, the court declared 
that “the State may no more disadvantage any particular group 
by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf 
than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a 
smaller representation than another of comparable size.”72 
According to the Sixth Circuit, the application of these 
principles to Proposal 2 is as follows: Prior to the passage of 
Proposal 2, anyone seeking to change admission policy for any 
reason could do so by lobbying either the admissions 
committees that made such decisions by lobbying the 
administrative structure up to and including the governing 
boards of the respective universities or, as actually happened, 
the people of Michigan directly.73 After the passage of Proposal 
                                                 
67 BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *36 (6th Cir. 2012), 
available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0386p-06.pdf [hereinafter 
BAMN II] (“Finding those provisions of Proposal 2 affecting Michigan’s public 
colleges and universities unconstitutional, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment 
granting the Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.”). 
68 Id. at *9. 
69 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
70 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
71 BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *10. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at *4. Notably, lobbying the legislature was not an option in this case 
because the public universities of Michigan have plenary authority, pursuant to the 
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2, these processes were still available to anyone seeking to 
change admission policy for any reason other than race, sex, 
ethnicity, or national origin.74 In contrast, anyone wishing to 
reinstate the consideration of race in the admission process 
would have to succeed in what the BAMN court considered 
the more burdensome process of another constitutional 
amendment repealing Proposal 2. Relying on Hunter and 
Seattle, the court stated: 
[E]qual protection of the laws is more than a guarantee of equal treatment 
under existing law. It is also a guarantee that minority groups may 
meaningfully participate in the process of creating these laws and the 
majority may not manipulate the channels of change so as to place unique 
burdens on issues of importance to them.
75
 
Even so, the court recognized that “the Constitution does 
not protect minorities from political defeat: Politics necessarily 
produces winners and losers.”76 The task for the Sixth Circuit, 
then, was to identify a method of determining whether a 
political process was legitimate, even though it may produce 
results that are undesirable to minorities. Drawing upon the 
Hunter and Seattle decisions, the court identified the two 
prongs of what it called the Hunter/Seattle test. Under this 
test, minority groups are denied equal protection when a 
governmental act: 
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures primarily to 
the benefit of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political power or reorders 
the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority 
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process.
77
 
Applying the Hunter/Seattle test to Proposal 2, the Sixth 
Circuit found that it had a racial focus because the affirmative 
action programs prohibited by the amendment primarily 
                                                                                                             
Michigan Constitution, to control the universities. Id. at *20. 
74 The court discounted Proposal 2’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex, 
ethnicity, and national origin as being irrelevant to the issue. Id. at n.4.  See Justice 
Gibbons’ dissenting opinion for a strong counter-argument. Id. at *44. 
75 Id. at *10. 
76 Id. at *11. 
77 Id. at *15. 
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benefitted minorities.78 Comparing the affirmative action 
programs in question to the integrative busing programs at 
issue in Seattle, the court reasoned that “[j]ust as the 
desegregative busing programs at issue in Seattle were designed 
to improve racial minorities’ representation at many public 
schools … race-conscious admissions policies increase racial 
minorities’ representation at institutions of higher 
education.”79 Further, the BAMN court stated that “it is 
enough that minorities may consider [the repealed policy] to be 
‘legislation that is in their interest.’”80 Applying this standard, 
the court found that the policies repealed by Proposal 2 “inure 
primarily to the benefit of racial minorities, and that such 
groups consider these policies to be in their interest.”81 
The BAMN court also found that Proposal 2 satisfied the 
second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test. The court started by 
explaining why the admissions process at the public 
universities of Michigan constitutes part of the political 
structure.82 Citing supplemental briefings from the university 
defendants, the court stressed the plenary role of the policy-
making boards of the universities83 and the fact that the 
members of the boards are popularly elected. Additionally, 
these elected boards have “enacted bylaws—which they have 
complete authority to revise or revoke—detailing admissions 
procedures.”84 The court recognized that the boards delegate 
this responsibility to admissions committees, but found this 
fact irrelevant because policy boards can and do change 
admissions bylaws frequently.85 Thus, the court considered the 
                                                 
78 BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *17 (“There is no material difference between the 
enactment in Seattle and Proposal 2, as both targeted policies that benefit minorities by 
enhancing their educational opportunities and promoting classroom diversity.”). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at *18. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *19–*23. 
83 Id. at *20. Indeed, the boards are described as “the highest form of juristic 
person known to the law, a constitutional corporation of independent authority, 
which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the 
legislature.” Id. 
84 BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *21. 
85 Id. (“Since 2008, the University of Michigan’s Board of Regents has revised 
more than two dozen of its bylaws, two of which fall within Chapter VIII, the section 
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admissions process to be part of the political process in 
Michigan. 
Having decided the question of the political nature of the 
admissions process, the BAMN court turned to whether 
Proposal 2 reordered the political process so as to place a special 
burden on minority interests. Noting that Hunter and Seattle 
established that both explicit and implicit restructuring 
satisfied this prong of the test,86 the BAMN court stated that 
“any ‘comparative structural burden,’ be it local or statewide or 
national, satisfies the reordering prong of the Hunter/Seattle 
test.”87 In Hunter, the political process had been altered so that 
changes related to housing and race had to gain the approval of 
both the City Council and a majority of the electorate.88 Even 
more burdensome, in Seattle, changes in school busing based 
on race had to gain the approval of either the state legislature 
or the statewide electorate.89 The Sixth Circuit found the 
political process to be altered as unfavorably to the interests of 
minorities by Proposal 2 as by either of the processes at issue in 
Hunter or Seattle. The court listed several different levels of 
government to which an interested party could apply for a 
change in admissions standards in any area other than race, 
including the ultimate process of constitutional amendment 
via ballot initiative. In contrast, parties interested in changing 
admissions standards in the area of race, after Proposal 2, had 
only the constitutional amendment process available to them.90 
At trial, the Michigan Attorney General (AG) tried to 
distinguish Proposal 2 from the procedural changes in Hunter 
and Seattle. Specifically, the AG argued that prohibiting 
preferential treatment of a group by the government, as 
Proposal 2 did, is different than prohibiting discrimination,91 as 
the procedural changes in Hunter and Seattle had done. The 
                                                                                                             
regulating admissions practices.”). 
86 Id. at *24 (discussing the explicit nature of the restructuring in Hunter and the 
implicit restructuring in Seattle). 
87 Id. at *25. 
88 Id. at *24. 
89 Id. 
90 BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *25-26. 
91 Id. at *27. 
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BAMN court found this argument unpersuasive. The court 
also specifically rejected a Ninth Circuit ruling on an 
analogous issue,92 holding, in effect, that the outcome of 
Proposal 2 was not the problem, but rather the change in 
process that it brought about.93 
V. DISCUSSION 
Given the politically controversial94 nature of the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion, it is unlikely that the BAMN decision will 
settle the matter of a state’s authority to prohibit affirmative 
action programs at the state level through ballot initiatives. 
This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Ninth 
Circuit reached a contradictory conclusion in a case dealing 
with Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative. In 
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,95 the Ninth Circuit 
held that an amendment to the California Constitution, with 
substantially similar requirements to those of Proposal 2, did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.96 As a result of these 
diametrically opposed decisions, both rendered by federal 
appellate courts, uncertainty exists in this area of law. 
Moreover, the lack of clarity touches on two specific areas of 
national importance: principles of federalism and the 
individual right to equal protection of the law. Considering 
the important issues involved, the split among the two federal 
appellate courts that ruled on the issue, and the reality of 
continuing efforts to pass similar initiatives in other states, 
careful analysis of the court’s opinion is warranted. In this 
section, the authors provide this analysis, focusing first on the 
                                                 
92 Id. at n.8 (citing Coal.for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 (1997)). 
93 BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 487 (2012) (“The 
distinction urged by the Attorney General and the dissenters thus erroneously imposes 
an outcome-based limitation on a process-based right. What matters is whether racial 
minorities are forced to surmount procedural hurdles in reaching their objectives over 
which other groups do not have to leap. If they are, the disparate procedural treatment 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the objective sought.”). 
94 That the opinion is controversial is certain. The reader will remember that the 
court overturned the will of a majority of voters in Michigan with the BAMN 
decision. 
95 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
96 Id. 
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strengths of the decision and second on its vulnerabilities. 
A. Strengths of the BAMN Opinion 
There are reasons to believe that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion 
in the BAMN case constitutes a faithful application of 
Supreme Court precedent and of the principle of equal 
protection. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit based its opinion on 
the Court’s opinions in Hunter v. Erickson97 and Washington 
v. Seattle School District No.1,98 which focus on political 
process theory. In doing so, the court made arguments that are 
at least rational and must be addressed. As noted above, the 
Hunter/Seattle test states that a governmental action violates 
the Equal Protection Clause if it: 
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures primarily to 
the benefit of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political power or reorders 
the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority 
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process.
99
 
It is clear by the language of the amendment that Proposal 2 
has, at least in part, a racial focus. Further, in light of evidence 
presented to the Court in Grutter and Gratz, it is equally clear 
that many individual members of minority groups have 
benefitted from the affirmative action programs prohibited by 
Proposal 2. Thus, it is at least a rational argument that the two 
articulated elements of the first prong of the Hunter/Seattle 
test are met. 
Likewise, there is rational support for the contention that 
the second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test is met. If one 
accepts, arguendo, that the first prong of the Hunter/Seattle 
test is met, it is almost beyond debate that Proposal 2 worked a 
reordering of the decision-making process in Michigan with 
regard to consideration, inter alia, of race in admission 
decisions.  Further, given the nature of mathematics, an 
argument can be made that minorities are less likely to be able 
to effect a reimplementation of affirmative action after 
Proposal 2 than they would be able to if the admission 
                                                 
97 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
98 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
99 BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (2012). 
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committees in question changed policies. Thus, it is at least 
rational that the two articulated elements of the second prong 
of the Hunter/Seattle test are met. 
The three above paragraphs describe the essence of the 
Sixth Circuit majority’s reasons for striking down Proposal 2, 
without missing much in the way of important details. 
Frankly, to the reader with a healthy level of skepticism, the 
foundation of the BAMN decision as articulated by the court 
is thin. However, the Grutter Court’s reliance on academic 
freedom as the basis for upholding the affirmative action 
programs in question may provide additional support for the 
BAMN decision. Specifically, the Court stated, “We have long 
recognized that, given the important purpose of public 
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”100 Based 
on this concept, the Grutter Court arguably set aside 
universities as almost an extra state constitutional entity.101 
After all, it used the special niche of universities, grounded in 
the First Amendment, to support the notion that the usual 
restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause do not constrain 
universities when it comes to academic decisions. One might 
extend this logic to argue that, if an explicit provision of the 
U.S. Constitution does not constrain a university in its choice 
of students then, a fortiori, neither can a state constitutional 
provision.102 
B. Weaknesses of the BAMN Opinion 
The arguments described above lend some support to the 
idea that Proposal 2 does violate the Equal Protection Clause 
under the political process theory. In spite of these arguments, 
several weaknesses exist in the BAMN opinion. The dissenting 
                                                 
100 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
101 This extra-constitutional status of public universities may even be stronger in 
Michigan than other states, considering the extraordinary provisions in the Michigan 
constitution related to the plenary authority of university governing boards. See supra 
note 73. 
102 This argument, of course, would have no application to the provisions of 
Proposal 2 relating to areas other than higher education. 
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opinions argued some of these points forcefully, pointing out, 
inter alia, that “a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race,”103 that Hunter and Seattle are 
inappropriate as precedents to BAMN due to fundamental 
differences in the underlying programs,104 that the admissions 
programs at Michigan’s universities were not really political in 
nature,105 and that Proposal 2 does not focus solely on race, but 
instead prohibits preferences for groups that, added together, 
make a majority.106 
The various dissents offered strong arguments against the 
majority’s application of political process theory in the BAMN 
case. But there is a more fundamental argument that political 
process theory is flawed per se. For example, regarding the first 
prong of the Hunter/Seattle test, the Sixth Circuit held that 
the affirmative action programs in question were of primary 
benefit to minority interests.107 If this is true, it contradicts the 
primary reasoning employed by the Grutter Court to uphold 
these plans in the first place. Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority in Grutter, clearly grounded the Court’s holding in 
the First Amendment right of universities to decide who gets 
to study there, based on what contributions a person can make 
to the intellectual atmosphere of a class.108 Thus, it was for the 
good of all persons involved in university life, not just for the 
sake of minority interests, that diversity was a compelling 
interest in Grutter. Any holding to the contrary, specifically 
                                                 
103 BAMN, 701 F.3d at 493 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 48, 93–98. 
105 Id. at 52. 
106 Id. at 67 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 479 (“We find that the holistic race-conscious admissions policies now 
barred by Proposal 2 inure primarily to the benefit of racial minorities, and that such 
groups consider these policies to be in their interest.”). 
108 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“The Law School’s concept of 
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce. These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, 
the Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to 
break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of 
different races.’ These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ 
when the students have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”). 
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one that supported non-remedial preferences for members of 
preferred racial groups, would arguably be in opposition to the 
foundational principle of the rule of law and the related 
principle of equal protection of the law. Without the 
justification of benefits to the academic marketplace of ideas 
as a whole, it is possible that the law school’s plan that 
instigated Proposal 2 would have been held unconstitutional in 
2003. 
Moreover, the BAMN court appears to have adopted a 
stance that is unjustifiably deferential to the plaintiffs when it 
comes to their claims to represent minority interests. It is one 
thing to defer to the expertise of university officials in 
academic matters, but quite another to defer to advocacy 
groups seeking preferential treatment under the law. 
Specifically, the phrase “in the interest of minorities”109 is so 
vague as to be subject to manipulation in service of special 
interests at the expense of equal protection and the rule of law. 
The court compounded this problem by imposing no 
limitations on things for which citizens could lobby, using 
such strong language as “whatever [their objectives] are.”110 The 
use of such language begs carrying the argument to its logical 
extreme. The logical extreme of distributing benefits and 
burdens along racial lines has been carried out in practicality in 
America, and the results have undermined rather than 
supported equality before the law, to say nothing of human 
dignity. If the Sixth Circuit was justified in its deference to 
“the interests of racial minorities,”111 how could any principled 
basis exist for limiting the allocation of benefits to members 
of minority groups? Where could any lines be drawn that were 
not arbitrary and unattached to principle? What of the rights 
of minorities who do not wish to be evaluated based on their 
skin color? The questions answer themselves and highlight the 
arbitrary and purely political nature of adopting a legal 
standard of “whatever [their objectives] are.”112 
Regarding the second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test, the 
                                                 
109 BAMN, 701 F.3d at 486. 
110 Id. at 482–83. 
111 Id. at 486. 
112 Id at 483. 
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Sixth Circuit’s opinion in BAMN purports to protect minority 
interests from majority manipulation of the political process. 
For instance, the court stated that Hunter and Seattle “set the 
benchmark for when the majority has not only won, but has 
rigged the game to reproduce its success indefinitely.”113 
Undoubtedly, such a rigging would violate fundamental 
fairness, but the conclusion that Proposal 2 does so is 
inconsistent with historical fact. The affirmative action 
programs at issue were voluntarily implemented through a 
political process in Michigan with a smaller minority 
population than exists today.114 Ignoring this fact, however, the 
Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the implied assumption that 
majority and minority interests are necessarily permanently set 
in opposition and on the dubious conclusion that all members 
of a group think and vote the same way. Supreme Court cases 
related to racial preferences since Grutter contain language 
skeptical of such thought.  In Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle, for example, a plurality of the prevailing 
majority noted that racial classifications “reinforce the belief, 
held by too many for too much of our history, that 
individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,” and 
“endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation 
divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of 
racial hostility and conflict.”115 
Despite the BAMN court’s concerns with manipulation of 
                                                 
113 Id. at 474–75. 
114 Census data reveal that since 1980, whites, as a percentage of the total 
population of Michigan, have been decreasing steadily from about 84% in 1980 to 
about 79% in 2010.  U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population (1980),  
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/ 
1980censusofpopu80124uns_bw.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General 
Population and Housing Characteristics (2010), available at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_DP/DPDP1/ 
0400000US26 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
115 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted). See also Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (“‘When 
we attribute equal protection rights to groups rather than to individuals, ‘it reinforces 
the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, 
education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have 
rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.’” (citing Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993))). 
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the political process, the opinion itself arguably turns the 
political process on its head. The practical result is that only 
university officials, specifically the faculty, can determine 
whether race should be considered when setting admissions 
standards.116 Following the logic of the BAMN court, even if 
every voter in the state except those on the admissions 
committee and at least a few members of a minority group 
who considered racial preferences to be in their interests 
wanted to prohibit racial preferences, they would be overruled 
by a relatively small number of faculty.117 Alternatively, the 
Sixth Circuit apparently would approve a state constitutional 
amendment that provided in detail every aspect of the 
admissions process, as this would not single out race at the 
most remote level of government. Obviously, this would be an 
unwieldy policy, but it is the only other practical way a state 
could prohibit affirmative action under the BAMN decision 
once a university had decided to implement it. As it stands, the 
BAMN decision arguably places unchecked power in the hands 
of a few faculty members, many—if not all—of whom are 
protected from political pressure by tenure.118 
It is true that the rule of law should allow a very few to 
overrule the very many in pursuit of fidelity to foundational 
principles. But in contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Coalition for Economic Equity v. 
Wilson119 suggests that just the opposite occurred when 
Proposal 2 was overturned. Ruling on political process theory 
                                                 
116 Writing in dissent, Judge Gibbons cites the testimony of the deans of the 
University of Michigan Law School and Wayne State’s law school, both of whom 
testified that all admission decisions rest with the faculty with essentially no process 
existing to overturn their decisions. In fact, the Dean of Wayne State testified that any 
attempt by the university’s board of governors to overrule faculty decisions regarding 
admissions would “precipitate a constitutional crisis.” BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 499–500 (2012). 
117 In fact, while no one seriously believes that any constitutional provision or 
other form of law represents unanimity of opinion, Proposal 2 does represent the 
collective political will of the people of Michigan on this issue. 
118 As an aside, anyone who has sat through a faculty meeting could tell you that 
it is not out of the realm of possibility that changing the minds of the electorate at 
large would be easier than changing the minds of a group of professors—less expensive, 
maybe, but not necessarily easier. 
119 Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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as it applied to Proposition 209 in California, the court noted 
that there is no affirmative requirement for the government to 
consider race in the decision-making process. The court stated: 
To hold that a democratically enacted affirmative action program is 
constitutionally permissible because the people have demonstrated a 
compelling state interest is hardly to hold that the program is 
constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of 
the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.
120
 
Again, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit 
arguably gave insufficient weight to the idea that there is a 
difference between lobbying for protection from 
discrimination and lobbying for racial preferences. The 
changes to political process that the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional in Hunter made it more difficult for 
individuals to seek protection from discrimination. In contrast, 
Proposal 2 made it more difficult for anyone to lobby for 
racial preferences. The Sixth Circuit addressed this difference 
by finding that the BAMN plaintiffs were not asserting a right 
to an outcome, but a right to lobby using the same process as 
for non-race related changes to policy.121 If accepted at face 
value, there is some force to that argument. But Proposal 2 did 
not deny anyone of any race the opportunity to lobby for race-
based admissions policy changes differently than anyone else. 
Thus, while the BAMN court stated that “the Constitution 
does not protect minorities from political defeat: Politics 
necessarily produces winners and losers,”122 it seems to have 
belied that principle with its ruling. If individuals in favor of 
affirmative action are free to compete in the same process as 
those against it, then the only thing left for the BAMN court 
to find objectionable is the likelihood of political defeat by 
numerically smaller advocacy groups. This being the case, the 
different outcomes sought in Hunter and BAMN are relevant 
                                                 
120 Id. at 709. 
121 The irony of this assertion seems to have escaped the BAMN court. Under the 
University of Michigan’s admissions plans, Asians and Caucasians must overcome not 
merely procedural barriers, but substantive ones that other groups do not have to leap.  
In fact, at times these barriers are insurmountable because no amount of lobbying the 
body politic will change an individual’s race. 
122 BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 474–75 (2012). 
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and substantially erode Hunter’s applicability to BAMN. 
The differing context of the Seattle case also leads to the 
conclusion that it is a bad analogy for the BAMN case. In 
BAMN, the court emphatically noted the fact that the Seattle 
case did not remediate de jure segregation, but instead sought 
to espouse integration. This was certainly true, but the Sixth 
Circuit over-extended itself with the following statement: 
“There is no material difference between the enactment in 
Seattle and Proposal 2, as both targeted policies that benefit 
minorities by enhancing their educational opportunities and 
promoting classroom diversity.”123 To the contrary, quite 
significant differences exist in the contexts of admissions in 
higher education and that of K-12 schools.124 In fact, the very 
race-based busing at issue in Seattle has subsequently been held 
to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle125 precisely because 
of the differences in the Seattle busing plan and the Grutter 
admissions plan. The Parents Involved Court found that the 
race-based admission policies of Seattle Public Schools were 
more akin to Michigan’s unconstitutional undergraduate 
admissions plan because they “rely on racial classifications in a 
‘nonindividualized, mechanical’ way.”126 The Court further 
stated, “In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter . . . this 
Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of 
higher education. . . . The present [Parents Involved] cases are 
not governed by Grutter.”127 Thus, Seattle’s precedential value 
to the BAMN case erodes as much as does that of Hunter, if 
for different reasons. 
From a broader perspective, Proposal 2 did set race apart as 
a category so that making a change to admissions policy in that 
area is arguably more burdensome than in other areas. But that 
is correctly viewed as consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
123 Id. at 478. 
124 See generally J. Kevin Jenkins, Grutter, Diversity & Public K-12 Schools, 182 
ED. LAW REP. 353 (2004) (discussing the application of Grutter in the K-12 education 
context). 
125 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
126 Id. at 723. 
127 Id. at 725. 
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Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and its underlying 
principles. It makes sense that anyone seeking to amend policy 
so that racial preferences may be granted by government 
would have a harder time than, say, someone seeking to do 
away with preferences for athletes. No one has a fundamental 
right to be considered for admission without regard to their 
lack of athletic ability. But everyone has at least a presumptive 
right to be considered without regard to race.128 
Concerning the fundamental right to be treated by the 
government without regard to one’s race, it is important to 
note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that that is an 
individual right, not a group right.129 In Adarand v. Pena, the 
Court stated, “The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution protect persons, not groups.”130 More recently in 
Grutter, the Court affirmed this principle, adding, “We are a 
‘free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality.’ It follows from that principle that ‘government 
may treat people differently because of their race only for the 
most compelling reasons.’”131 More recently still, in Parents 
Involved, the Supreme Court listed a litany of precedents 
upholding this notion, going back to the Brown v. Board of 
Education cases, in which the Court stated, “At stake is the 
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public 
schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis.”132 In the face of the 
Court’s insistence on the individual right to equal protection, 
it is difficult to imagine it upholding the notion that groups 
have a collective right to a specific process to lobby for what is 
only barely permissible and only for a limited time.133 
                                                 
128 Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(noting “the presumptive invalidity of a State’s use of racial classifications to 
differentiate its treatment of individuals.”). 
129 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
130 Id. 
131 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
132 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 
(1955) (emphasis in Parents Involved opinion)). 
133 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).  See 
also Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the time 
limitation on affirmative action programs in employment). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Sixth Circuit in BAMN and the Ninth Circuit in 
Coalition for Economic Equity ruled on a very similar issue: 
whether a state constitutional amendment prohibiting the 
consideration of race in the context of college admissions 
violates the Equal Protection Clause under political process 
theory. But the Sixth and Ninth Circuits reached conclusions 
that were at opposite ends of the spectrum. Consequently, 
whether the Equal Protection Clause is violated by such 
amendments currently depends on whether the state that 
passed the amendment is in the Sixth or Ninth Circuit. As to 
states outside those jurisdictions, the law is unknown. 
Considering the likely continuation of efforts to enact ballot 
initiatives in states outside the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 
conflict around this issue will surely continue.134 Further, for 
reasons described above, the BAMN court’s application of 
political process theory to Proposal 2 arguably erodes the 
substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause and the 
fundamental principle of the rule of law. The opposing 
opinions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits lead to both 
confusion and unpredictability in this area of law and a 
variation of substantive, even foundational, rights across states. 
In order to provide for consistency and predictability, the 
Supreme Court must take the opportunity presented by the 
Michigan case to reconcile the dichotomy established by the 
existing appellate court decisions. 
 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Affirmative Action: State 
Action (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-
action-state-action.aspx, for a list of recently passed ballot initiatives or referenda 
outlawing racial preferences in several states. 
